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This research investigates the role of corporate governance on the disclosure of corporate business risk 
management with leverage and company size as control variables. Research data were taken from a company 
that classified as LQ 45 on the Indonesian stock exchange from 2015 to 2018. This research finds that 
disclosure of business risk management as a sign that management has managed the company with the good 
attitude increases along with increased corporate governance activities. Leverage and company size also affect 
company policies regarding the disclosure of corporate business risks. Overall, the results of this study are 
consistent with the assumption that corporate governance affects company policies regarding business risk 
disclosure. However, in contrast to the initial hypothesis, the composition of the board commissioners reduces 
the risk management disclosure activity in the company. This is because the board of commissioners considers 
that business risk disclosure can increase costs and reduce its competitive advantage so that investors will 
respond negatively. Apart from these variables, this study contributes to agency theory, where the findings of 
this study indicate the confirmation of the application of theory in the context of this study. 
 




Penelitian ini menyelidiki peran tata kelola perusahaan terhadap pengungkapan manajemen risiko bisnis 
perusahaan dengan leverage dan size perusahaan sebagai variable control. Data penelitian meliputi 
perusahaan yang tergolong LQ 45 di bursa efek Indonesia dari tahun 2015 hingga 2018. Penelitian ini 
menemukan bahwa pengungkapan manajemen risiko bisnis sebagai tanda bahwa manajemen telah berperilaku 
baik dalam mengelola perusahaan meningkat seiring dengan peningkatan aktivitas tata Kelola perusahaan. 
Leverage dan ukuran perusahaan juga mempengaruhi kebijakan perusahaan mengenai pengungkapan risiko 
bisnis perusahaan. Secara keseluruhan, hasil penelitian ini konsisten dengan dugaan bahwa tata kelola 
perusahaan mempengaruhi kebijakan perusahaan mengenai pengungkapan risiko bisnis. Namun, berbeda 
dengan hipotesis awal komposisi dewan komisaris menurunkan aktivitas pengungkapan manajemen risiko 
diperusahaan. Hal ini dikarenakan dewan komisaris menimbang bahwa pengungkapan risiko bisnis dapat 
meningkatkan biaya serta menurunkan keunggulan kompetitif perusahaan sehingga akan direspon negatif oleh 
investor. Selain variabel tersebut, penelitian ini berkontribusi pada teori agensi dimana temuan yang ada 
menunjukkan konfirmasi dari penerapan teori di dalam konteks penelitian. 
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Not only popular, but corporate 
governance also shows its existence with 
many studies that prove that the 
application of good corporate governance 
(GCG) has become one of the indicators of 
company success. Furthermore, the 
application of good governance is 
expected to improve company 
performance, to increase the value of the 
company and provide benefits for 
shareholders (Bai et al., 2004). In addition 
to improving company performance, the 
GCG can also enhance the quality of 
corporate profits (Ghofar & Islam, 2013, 
2015).  In the development of the business 
world at present, it is not enough for 
business actors to only ensure that 
management is running efficiently, but 
also GCG instruments are needed to 
ensure that company management 
activities are carried out properly. 
(Kaihatu, 2006; Khalid et al., 2016; Urban, 
2019).  
The Global Risk Management 
Survey shows that more than 83 percent of 
companies worldwide had a corporate risk 
management program (Deloitte, 2019). 
Risk is a reality that cannot be separated 
from company activities or decision 
making. Risks need to be managed 
properly so as not to cause a greater 
negative impact on the company. Many 
benefits will be obtained by the company 
when able to manage risk well. As 
explained by Power (2004), companies 
that proactively manage their risks besides 
being able to detect fraud but can also 
improve the quality of financial statements 
(Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Yatim, 
2010). Besides, good risk management is 
believed to improve company performance 
(Aebi et al., 2012; COSO, 2004; Pagach & 
Warr, 2010; Simkins & Ramirez, 2008; 
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996) and will 
increase value and excellence competitive 
shareholders (Nocco & Stulz, 2006; Rosli 
et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2016). Aabo (2006) 
argues that companies that conduct risk 
management well can increase satisfaction 
for stakeholders. Implementation of good 
risk management will generate profits and 
ensure the sustainability of the company's 
operations that lead to shareholder trust. 
Research conducted by Nocco & 
Stulz (2006)  shows that no method can 
assess whether the risk management 
policies implemented in a company are 
good or not. However, to assess the 
performance of the risk committee’s 
chairman, the board and shareholders can 
evaluate by looking at the extent to which 
risks can be identified and managed. The 
results of the identification and 
management of risk are information that 
must be disclosed because it can be useful 
for decision making. Considering the 
characteristics of companies in Indonesia 
whose share ownership is concentrated and 
much owned by families (Nuryaman, 
2009), the agency theory developed by 
Schleiver & Vishny (1986) is suitable for 
this study. Agency theory developed by 
Schleiver & Vishny (1986), illustrates the 
problems that arise between majority share 
ownership and minority stock ownership 
that occurs in a company. It is feared that 
the majority of shareholders will have 
more control over company policies and 
thus expropriate minority shareholders. In 
order to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders, the company must have a 
certain rule that is good corporate 
governance (Schleiver & Vishny, 1986). 
So far, the research that links 
corporate governance and risk 
management has shown inconsistent 
results. Research by Yatim (2010) and 
Subramaniam, Mcmanus, & Zhang (2009) 
shows that companies that have a greater 
proportion of independent boards on the 
board structure tend to build risk 
management committees separately from 
the audit committee. On the other hand, 
Desender (2007) proves that the 
independent board of commissioners in the 
organizational structure has no relationship 
with increasing the level of corporate 
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business risk management. The 
independent board of directors only has a 
significant relationship to the company's 
business risk management if there is a 
separation between the supervisory 
function and the management function 
which shows an increase in the level of 
risk management. 
Based on the background that has 
been described, the role of business risk 
management as a manifestation of GCG is 
very important in the process of a 
company carrying out all its activities. It 
fits for companies in Indonesia to pay 
more attention to corporate risk 
management as a manifestation of good 
corporate governance. However, in 
practice, not all companies have 
implemented integrated risk management. 
This research is also to answer the 
question of whether the application of 
good corporate governance can affect the 
level of risk management disclosures 
conducted by the company. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agency Theory 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) define 
agency relationships as contracts, where 
one or several people (principals) employ 
other people (agents), in this case, 
management is given a mandate by 
shareholders to carry out tasks in 
managing a company. In other words, the 
principal or shareholders delegate their 
authority to management to make and 
carry out decisions to achieve goals. 
Eisenhardt (1989) explains that agency 
theory is based on the assumption, that as a 
human being, management tends to have a 
selfish nature, makes all decisions and 
behaviours that are taken will benefit 
themselves (self-interest). Furthermore, 
management is also described as having 
risk aversion. On the other hand, 
management in an organization is 
described as many individuals who have a 
variety of interests in it. Therefore, 
management will be vulnerable to conflict.  
The next assumption is about 
information, information is very important 
in a business organization, as a basis for 
decision making in achieving goals. 
Seeing the importance of information, in a 
business organization information is seen 
as a commodity that is traded. With the 
underlying assumptions and the separation 
between shareholders and management, a 
conflict will arise between them. Barnhart 
& Rosenstein (1998) states that the way to 
overcome the agency conflict problem is 
by implementing good corporate 
governance. The development of agency 
theory is not only interpreted as a conflict 
between the principal and agent, but  a 
problem that arises because the majority 
shareholder have more control over 
company policies, and tend to harm 
minority shareholders (Schleiver & 
Vishny, 1986). To protect the interests of 
minority shareholders from the majority 
shareholder, the company and its 
management must have and run a set of 
specific regulatory mechanisms, namely 
what is called good corporate governance 
(Schleiver & Vishny, 1986). 
 
The Effect of Board of Commissioners 
Composition on Risk Management 
Disclosures 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) identified 
two ways to reduce managers' 
opportunities to take actions that are 
detrimental to investors, one of which is 
by outside investors overseeing 
management. One form of supervision 
carried out by investors is to regulate the 
mechanism of characteristics of the board 
of commissioners. The characteristics of 
the board of commissioners have a 
significant role in encouraging managers 
to implement risk management and 
effective internal control (Gordon et al., 
2009; Yatim, 2010; Zhang et al., 2007). 
The independence that is owned by an 
independent commissioner is expected to 
function as the most effective monitoring 
and policy control tool and manager's 
activities. Outside parties such as 
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independent commissioners must have the 
expertise and objectivity to control and 
give advice to a manager. Therefore, an 
independent board of commissioners is 
expected to be more aware and objective 
to provide a superior monitoring function 
to the company's internal control and 
corporate risk management (Yatim, 2010). 
The supervisory role of the board of 
commissioners is expected to reduce 
agency problems between shareholders 
and management. Therefore, the market 
will tend to support the existence of 
independent commissioners (Lefort & 
Urzúa, 2008). Besides, an independent 
board will provide a balance for managers 
as insiders so that managers cannot take 
advantage of their positions at the expense 
of the interests of shareholders (Yunos, 
2011). Not only the independence factor, 
Suhaimi & Mohamad Naim (2017) states 
that the level of supervision by the board 
of commissioners which is largely 
influenced by the quality and the 
educational background can also increase 
business risk management activities in the 
company. Based on this, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: The composition of the board of 
commissioners influences the 
disclosure of corporate risk 
management 
 
The Effect of Composition and 
Expertise Background of the Audit 
Committee on Corporate Risk 
Management Disclosures  
The Audit Committee, as part of the 
monitoring system, is also considered to 
make a positive contribution to the 
implementation of internal control and risk 
management. Accounting and financial 
expertise and the educational background 
of audit committee members are expected 
to increase the effectiveness of internal 
control and risk management. Weaknesses 
in internal control are found more in 
companies whose audit committees lack 
accounting and financial expertise (Zhang 
et al., 2007).  
Dionne & Triki (2005) also 
examined whether the new rules on 
corporate governance are known as 
Sarbanes Oxley which provides additional 
requirements regarding the composition 
and background knowledge related to 
accounting and financial audit committees 
that exist in the company. This research 
proves that the performance appraisal of 
the company's risk management increases 
when the company has a composition of 
the board of commissioners and an audit 
committee that is independent and has 
financial knowledge and is highly 
educated. In addition, the study also found 
that the requirements of the composition of 
the audit committee and independence 
were beneficial to shareholders. Based on 
this, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: The audit committee composition 
and expertise influence the disclosure 
of corporate risk management  
 
The Effects of Reputation and Opinion 
of External Auditors on Risk 
Management Disclosures 
Auditor independence was identified 
as having a positive relationship with 
internal control. Changes in auditors are 
found to be more likely in companies with 
weaknesses in internal control (Zhang et 
al., 2007). Therefore external auditors are 
one of the important mechanisms in 
internal control and risk management 
mechanisms in a company. Companies 
that use external auditors with greater 
reputations will have the possibility of 
reducing financial reporting and internal 
control problems (Doyle et al., 2007). 
According to Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & 
Wright (2004) companies with big four 
auditors encourage higher quality internal 
control mechanisms. In general, big four 
auditors can influence their clients' internal 
control systems by making improvement 
recommendations and design 
(Subramaniam et al., 2009) in order to 
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meet the need for maintenance of audit 
quality and protection of their reputation. 
Based on this, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H3: The reputation and opinion of 
the external auditor influences the 
disclosure of risk management 
 
The Effect of Frequency of Board of 
Commissioners' Meetings on the 
Disclosures of Corporate Risk 
Management  
Other board’s characteristics, such as 
the expertise and the frequency of 
meetings also postulate a positive 
relationship with the establishment of a 
risk management committee. Research 
conducted by DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault, & Reed (2002) shows that 
a greater frequency of meetings is 
associated with a reduction in incidents of 
financial reporting problems and 
improvement in the quality of external 
audits. The frequency of meetings 
encourages the board of commissioners to 
obtain information on the condition of the 
company more intensive, relevant, and 
timely, especially about risks and better 
quality of internal control. The higher 
frequency of meetings can provide positive 
signals to users of financial statements on 
the company's performance in achieving 
the company's goals. The high frequency 
of attendance from the board of 
commissioners expected to increase the 
knowledge of members, and broad 
knowledge is suspected to increase the 
attention to the risk management in the 
company  (Yatim, 2010). Based on this, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: The frequency of the board of 
commissioners' meeting influence the 
disclosure of corporate risk 
management. 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODS 
Population and Samples 
This research is a quantitative study 
using data obtained from the company's 
financial statements and annual reports. 
This research on the effect of corporate 
governance on the disclosure of business 
risk management of this company uses the 
object of research in the form of a 
company listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) included in the LQ45 
index with a 4-year observation period, 
2015-2018. 
The sample selection in this study is 
to use a purposive sampling method. The 
following are the criteria for selecting the 
sample of this study. 




1 Companies included in 
the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange LQ45 index 
     45 
2 Companies that do not 
have complete data 
needed in research 
    (14) 
 Companies used as 
research samples 
      31 
 
Based on the criteria used in the selection 
of samples in this study, 31 companies 
were selected as the research samples. This 
research was conducted using data in the 
2015-2018 period so that the total 
observation data in this study was 124 
observations. 
 
Measurement of Company Risk 
Management Disclosures 
An adequate risk management 
system must meet certain requirements so 
that its reliability in supporting the 
successful implementation of the 
company's risk management (Tjahjadi, 
2011). COSO (2004) states that a 
company's risk management must have 
one element, namely risk disclosure as an 
indication that the company carries out 
overall corporate risk management. 
Therefore, this study uses business risk 
disclosure in corporate financial reporting 
as an indication that management has 
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implemented corporate risk management 
that is disclosed in the annual report as a 
proxy. Companies that have disclosed the 
description of business risks in the annual 
report can be concluded that the company 
has carried out risk management. The 
company information that is sampled in 
this study reveals risk management in the 
annual report as follows. 






Exist 124 100 
Not Exist 0 0 
Total 124 100 
 
Based on the information on the 
table above, all the sample companies 
taken in this study, 124 annual reports 
have revealed risk management. This 
means the majority of companies 
incorporated in LQ 45 have implemented 
integrated risk management. To analyze 
the effect of independent variables on risk 
management disclosures in this study, each 
company counts how many aspects of risk 
management are disclosed in the annual 
report. The more aspects disclosed in the 
annual report, the higher the disclosure of 
business risk management by the 
company. 
 
Measurement of Corporate Governance  
The measurement of corporate 
governance variables in this study uses a 
proxy called the Good Corporate 
Governance Scoring Index, represented by 
the composition of the board of 
commissioners, the composition and 
background of the audit committee's 
expertise, the quality and opinion of 
external audits, and the frequency of board 
meetings. According to Gwenda & Juniarti 
(2013), high good corporate governance 
scoring index shows that the 
implementation of corporate governance is 
getting better. If the implementation of 
corporate governance is getting better, 
then it will also have an impact on high 
company value. 
In this research, the components of 
corporate governance criteria are divided 
into four, namely: the composition of the 
board of commissioners, reputation and 
external audit opinion, composition and 
background of the expertise of the audit 
committee, the frequency of the board of 
commissioners meeting which is an 
assessment that a company has 
implemented good corporate governance.  
Measurement of Control Variables 
Leverage is an instrument to 
measure a company's ability to meet its 
financial obligations consisting of short-
term debt and long-term debt.  Pagach & 
Warr (2010) argues that companies that 
can meet their financial obligations 
properly will take the initiative to improve 
risk management programs properly. 
Leverage in this study is represented by 
the debt to equity ratio. The debt to equity 
ratio can be calculated using the following 
formula (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003): 
                    
 
         
             
       
The size of the company is the size 
of assets owned by the company. Desender 
(2007) argues that the need to implement 
integrated enterprise risk management 
requires effective risk management 
techniques, companies that have a larger 
scale have the greater ability also to 
implement integrated enterprise risk 
management. Measurement of company 
size using total assets as a proxy has been 
widely used by previous researchers, one 
of which was conducted by Liebenberg & 
Hoyt (2003) which states that risk 
management is also influenced by 
company size factors, where company size 
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is proxied by the logarithmic value of total 
assets or can be written as follows. 
 
                        
 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis Test  
Hypothesis testing is intended to 
determine whether the individual variables 
affect the dependent variable. Ghozali 
(2018) argues that in hypothesis testing, 
we want to know the effect of an 
independent variable in explaining the 
dependent variable. The test is carried out 
by looking at the level of significance of 
each variable with a level of significance 
(1%, 5%, 10%), The description of the 
results of variable testing is presented in 
the table below. 
Table 3 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Results 




























* 1% level of significance  
** 5% level of significance  
*** 10% level of significance 
 
The Effect of Board of Commissioners 
Composition on Corporate Risk 
Management Disclosures 
This research can prove that the 
composition of the board of 
commissioners influences the disclosure 
of the company's business risk 
management. The regression coefficient 
value of the composition of the board of 
commissioner’s variable is -3,388*. This 
result shows that the composition of the 
company's board of commissioners 
negatively affects the disclosure of the 
company's business risk management. 
Although many previous studies indicate 
that as the increase in corporate 
governance activities embodied in the 
composition of the board of 
commissioners will increase the disclosure 
of risk management conducted by 
management, the results of this study 
contradict with the previous research. The 
results of this study show that the 
composition of the board of 
commissioners decreases the disclosure of 
business risks carried out by management. 
This is because disclosure of risk in the 
annual report is considered to reduce the 
competitive advantage of their products in 
the market, the presence of competitive 
advantage is more positively responded by 
investors compared to risk disclosures 
made by management, so disclosures tend 
to be avoided by the board. Samaha, 
Khlif, & Hussainey (2015) argue that the 
decline in competitive advantage is due to 
the increased costs incurred by 
management to make disclosures. This 
significant increase in costs can increase 
product prices and reduce the company's 
competitive advantage in terms of prices 
in the market. Therefore the board tends to 
minimise the disclosure activities to 
reduce costs, so that it is expected that 
their competitive advantage and profits 
can be reached. 
 
 
The Effect of Composition and 
Expertise Background of the Audit 
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Committee on Corporate Risk 
Management Disclosures  
The audit committee is formed by 
the board of commissioners to assist and 
carry out the duties of the board of 
commissioners. Audit committee members 
must have expertise and experience in the 
audit field and other qualities required. 
The bigger the size of company, the 
greater the complexity possessed by the 
company. This will make it difficult for 
the board of directors to oversee the 
company, therefore the board often 
delegates its duties and responsibilities in 
terms of supervision and management to 
employees. This will encourage the board 
of directors to ask the audit committee to 
assist the board of directors in terms of 
oversight to company management to 
ensure that management works in 
accordance with the objectives set by the 
company. The audit committee as part of 
the supervision system is also considered 
to make a positive contribution to the 
company's internal control system and the 
company's business risk management 
(Zhang et al., 2007). Audit committee 
competence is much influenced by the 
educational background obtained by the 
audit committee members. Zhang et al. 
(2007) state that the weaknesses of risk 
management and internal control of a 
company are more commonly found in 
companies that have less accounting and 
financial expertise on the audit committee.  
Based on the results, the 
composition and background of the audit 
committee's expertise positively affect the 
disclosure of the company's business risk 
management. The results of this study 
reinforce the results of previous studies 
conducted by Dionne & Triki (2005). 
Dionne & Triki (2005) states that the 
composition of the audit committee can 
increase the risk management activities 
carried out by the company. This is 
because the existence of an independent 
audit committee will tend to maintain their 
performance as a function of supervision 
of management, this is also because an 
independent audit committee will tend to 
maintain the reputation of the shareholders 
and external parties.  
 
The Effects of Reputation and Opinion 
of External Auditors on Disclosure of 
Corporate Business Risk Management 
Companies that use external auditors 
with a greater reputation will have the 
possibility of reducing the problems of 
financial reporting and internal control 
(Sari, 2013). In that research Sari (2013) 
defines the reputation of external auditors 
as referring to the Public Accounting Firm 
(KAP) who has a good name, 
achievements and has the trust of the 
public. KAP which is included in the big-
four categories is a KAP that is considered 
to have a good reputation and has gained 
good public trust. Big four auditors are 
auditors who have an excellent reputation, 
big four auditors will tend to maintain their 
reputation as competent auditors. 
Therefore, the big four auditors will 
encourage their clients to implement 
corporate governance (Subramaniam et al., 
2009). 
Several previous studies state that 
the use of external auditors classified as 
big four has no influence on the risk 
management activities in a company 
(Andarini & Januarti, 2012; Subramaniam 
et al., 2009). The results of testing the 
hypotheses in this study reinforce the 
results of research conducted by 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) and Andarini & 
Januarti (2012), the reputation and opinion 
of external auditors classified as big four 
did not affect the disclosure of the 
company's business risk management. This 
is because not all companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange use the services 
of a big four external auditor, so the use of 
the services of a big four external auditor 
cannot be concluded to significantly 
influence the increase in the company's 
business risk management activities.  
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The Effect of Frequency of Board of 
Commissioners' Meetings on Corporate 
Risk Management Disclosures  
The perseverance of a board of 
commissioners can be seen from the 
frequency of attendance of the meeting 
and the behavior of the board members in 
the meeting. Such behavior includes the 
number of board members who attend 
meetings, preparations before board 
meetings, and participation by board 
members in board meetings (Yatim, 2010). 
The board of commissioners will increase 
the frequency of their meetings to discuss 
the results and recommendations given by 
the risk management committee related to 
the risks experienced by the company and 
their solutions. The results of hypothesis 
testing in this study reinforce the results of 
previous studies, namely the frequency of 
meetings conducted by the board of 
commissioners significantly affect the 
disclosure of the company's business risk 
management. The larger the company, the 
greater the risks and problems faced. The 
board of commissioners as the holders of 
responsibilities given by the shareholders 
to maintain the effectiveness of the 
company's goals will try to find solutions 
to the risks and problems experienced by 
the company. To find solutions to 
problems, the board of commissioners will 
hold an intensive meeting.  
 
The Effect of Leverage on Corporate 
Risk Management Disclosures 
Leverage is a ratio used in measuring 
a company's ability to meet its financial 
obligations which consist of short-term 
debt and long-term debt. Pagach & Warr 
(2010) argues that companies that can 
meet their financial obligations properly 
will take the initiative to improve good 
risk management programs. Companies 
that have high debt tend to have high 
agency costs, so this can lead to high 
financial risk. Companies that have high 
leverage tend to have high going-concern 
risk (Subramaniam et al., 2009). 
The test results of the control 
variable that is leverage in this study 
showed a significant influence on the 
disclosure of the company's business risk 
management. The coefficient value of this 
variable is 0.281*** which means the 
leverage ratio positively affects the 
disclosure of the company's business risk 
management. This research supports a 
study conducted by several previous 
researchers (Kumalasari et al., 2014; 
Pagach & Warr, 2010; Utomo & Chariri, 
2014). According to agency theory, 
creditors and shareholders of companies 
that have high-risk debt structures tend to 
require management to disclose more 
complete information in annual reports, of 
course, shareholders consider that 
management policies in managing debt are 
important to them, companies that have 
comparisons Large debt in the company's 
capital structure is a risk for shareholders. 
With a high level of debt, the company has 
an obligation to pay interest to creditors, 
therefore it will affect the dividends that 
will be distributed to shareholders. While 
creditors, see that companies that have a 
high debt structure will have a high risk of 
not being able to fulfill their debt 
obligations. Therefore, shareholders and 
creditors tend to demand management to 
disclose all risks that could affect them in 
the annual report prepared by 
management. 
 
The Effect of Company Size on 
Corporate Risk Management Disclosures 
Company size is the size of an asset 
owned by a company. Large companies 
tend to establish and increase activities 
that are considered beneficial for these 
companies (Chen et al., 2009), large 
companies have a great potential to have 
bigger agency problems, because large 
companies tend to be difficult to supervise. 
more thoroughly (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Some previous research prove that 
company size has a significant effect on 
improving corporate risk management 
(Andarini & Januarti, 2012; Desender, 
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2007; Subramaniam et al., 2009). Andarini 
& Januarti (2012) argue that the larger the 
company, the more likely it will be to 
establish and enhance the activities of 
corporate governance and business risk 
management of the company, this is 
because the company wants to maintain 
the good name of the company. 
Based on the results of research 
conducted, company size as a control 
variable used in this study shows that 
company size has a significantly positive 
influence on the disclosure of the 
company's business risk management. 
Large companies tend to want to maintain 
their reputation by increasing activities 
that benefit them, one of which is the 
company's business risk management 
(Andarini & Januarti, 2012). Desender 
(2007) believes that the need to implement 
integrated enterprise business risk 
management requires effective risk 
management techniques. Companies that 
have a larger scale also have a greater 
ability to implement integrated business 
risk management in the company. This is 
because companies that have a larger scale 
have more resources to implement the 
company's business risk management 
better. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This study aims to investigate about 
the effect of corporate governance on the 
disclosure of the company's business risk 
management, as an indicate that the 
company has implemented corporate risk 
management. This research was conducted 
at companies classified as LQ 45 on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) with the 
2015-2018 research period. This research 
proves that there is a significant influence 
between the composition of the board of 
commissioners on the disclosure of the 
company's business risk management. 
However, this significant influence shows 
a negative direction, the results of this 
study actually contradict the results of 
research conducted by  Subramaniam et al. 
(2009), Yatim (2010) and Dionne & Triki 
(2005). In this study also succeeded in 
proving that the composition and 
background expertise of the audit 
committee has a positive and significant 
effect on the disclosure of the company's 
business risk management. In addition to 
the composition of the board of 
commissioners and the audit committee, 
this study also provides empirical evidence 
that the frequency of meetings conducted 
by the board of commissioners has a 
positive and significant effect on the 
disclosure of corporate risk management. 
This is due to the greater problems faced 
by companies increasingly demanding the 
board of commissioners to get an 
understanding of the problems and 
solutions that must be done, thus 
demanding the members of the board of 
commissioners to be more active in 
holding meetings. It can also increase risk 
management activities. Increased risk 
management activities and the frequency 
of meetings disclosed can be positive 
signals to users of financial statements.   
Leverage and company size which 
are the control variables in this study also 
indicate a significant influence on the 
disclosure of company risk management. 
On the other hand, the results of this study 
failed in proving that the use of external 
auditors classified as big four had a 
significant influence on the disclosure of 
corporate risk management. This can be 
since the use of external auditors classified 
as big four is only used to enhance the 
reputation alone by the company and the 
big four external auditors in this case only 
pay attention to financial risk monitoring. 
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